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Much of the new growth literature stresses countly characteristics, such as education levels or
political stability, as the dominant determinant of growth. However, growth rates are highly
unstable over time, with a correlation across decades of .1 to .3, while country characteristics are
stable, with cross-decade correlations of .6 to .9. Shocks, especially those to terms of trade, play
a large role in explaining variance in growth. These findings suggest either that shocks are
important relative to country characteristics in determining long-run growth, or that worldwide
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Muchof the new growth literature stresses country characteristics as the dominant determinant
of growth performance. A vast empirical literature tests the effects of country characteristics on
growth.' This paper presents a fact suggesting the emphasis on country characteristics is misguided:
growth rates are highly unstable over time, while country characteristics are highly persistent. The
correlation across decades of countries' growth rates of income per capita is around .1(0 .3. while
most country characteristics display cross-decade correlations of .6 to .9. Correlations of growth
across periods as long as two decades —periodlengths comparable to those used in the cross-section
empirical literature —aresimilarly low. With a few famous exceptions, the same countries do not do
well period after period; countries are 'success stories' one period and disappointments the next.
The low persistence of growth rates reconciles the enormous variation in growth rates across
countries with the remarkable stability of relative incomes across countries. For each of the last two
decades the standard deviation of growth rates has been over 2.5, nearly the growth difference
between Japan and the US. Yet the correlation of (Summers and Heston (1991)) GDP per capita in
1960 and 1988 was .92. Even more striking the rank correlation of GDP per capita for the 28
countries for which Maddison (1989) has data is .82 over 1870-1988. Major changes in country
income ranldngs would have required large persistent differences in growth rwts; in the event,
income rankings did not change much and only a small fraction of the growth differences between
countries were persistent.
Among the counny ch cicflsdca this Ilicrasot cuisines ale policies affecisag the price or quanety of equipnient Invesuneit (Do Long
andSummers(1991.1992, 1993), polElesaflcciing rnseaith and dentopmenn(Romef (1989.1990)), inveignenl in physical capial
(Romer(1986.1991)) huisin capinll (Lucai (1988). Bum (1991). Bonn and Lee (1993)).mmiiinco (Basis (1991)).distorsonary
policy esvtrvnmems(Murpfly.Shleifer.sodvishny (l991). Easierly (1993)). government spending (Basis (1990). isa policy (King au
Rebolo (1990). Jones viiManaelli(1990)).rii policy (King and Levine (1993). Levine (1991). Oseenwood and Jovanovic(1990).
0db ((989)). trade policy (Youii (1991). Grossman and Helpinin (1991). Riveit Bonn sod Romer (1991). Horniest (1991)). alconsi
d,smbuaon (Alesins and Rodrik (199)), Perasoca and Tabellini (1991)), macroeconomic policy (Fischer (1991. 1993)) and evenediiucuy
(Bor)as ((992)), legal inseiwdoni (North (1989)) and teligioa (Dc Long (1988)).3
This paper has three sections and a conclusion. The first section presents the basic facts about
persistence of cross country growth differences and of country characteristics. The second section
attempts to identify the temporary shocks important in explaining low persistence of growth rates
across decades. The third section interprets low persistence under two types of growth models:
models in which country characteristics determine long-run growth rates and models in which country
characteristics determine relative levels of steady state income and long-run growth rates are
determined by worldwide technological change. A conclusion summarizes the results.
I) Low Persistence of Growth Rate DilTerences Across Countries
(a) Bcic facts
Thepersistence of growth rate differences across countries, even over long periods, is low.
Table 1 presents correlations of the least-squares growth rate of GDP per worker between 1960-69,
1970-79 and 1980-88. The R2 obtained by regressing the current growth rate on the previous
decade's growth was less than 10 percent. Little of the variation of growth rates is explained by past
growth.3 This low persistence result is robust over the choice of country sample, time period, and
sectors] performance measure.
Figure 1 displays the scatterplot of the growth razes for 115 countries over two periods, 1960-.
73 and 1974-88. The dotted lines show the averages in each period. A large portion of the sample is
contained in the off-diagonal quadrants: above-average in 1960-73 and below average in 1974-88, or
vice versa. The rank correlation is 21 in the figure.
'Thedam on real GOP per worker is iakesi from the PennWorld TablesMark 5 of Summers and Hesmon(1991). Weobiau similar
renilo usingWorldBankdam ongrowth rows of owpee perworkervaluediicomomea localpnces.RumdOiso alto similarwithGOP per
capiw:we used GOP per worker sara is is a bewse aure of preducuvity change. The use of the lease-squares growth rue reduces the
sonsmoviry in end-poino: conventional cosirpowal growth iown iso even less peroisinsa. We have a prrofl occluded high-income od exporTers.
i.e. Kuwait aid Saudi Arabia. because their growth depends enorely on varwsona in oil production. Including Kuwaie would raise
peraisreere (To about .35) because it has irkingly aeganve growth in all periods.
'Others who have previously nosed dim iodide De Long and Suounero (1991). Levine and Rutsok (1991). and Fitcher (1987). Qush
(I 993) hat recendy proseneeda sunilar finding, nombly the insiabiliry of growth across penoda in Markov Transition maresces.4
The boxes in the corners represent the deciles of the period growth rates. The northeast box
represents countrieswith growth inthe top deciles in both periods. The southwest box shows the
countries persistently in the bottom decile. The northeast box (persistent success) contains Botswana
and the famous Asian Gang of Four (Hong Kong is actually just short of being in the top decile in the
tirst period). The East Asian success story is well Imown, while Botswana has benefitted from
extensive diamond mines and from a democratic government that has avoided some of its neighbors'
economic mistakes. The widespread perception of strong country effects in growth is strongly
influenced by the Gang of Four; without them and Botswana, the already low correlation of growth
rates between periods is cut in half. In contrast, persistence is not raised much by deleting a small
number of outliers.
Persistence is also low for several subsamples of countries. The second, third and fourth rows
of Table 1 show the correlations for non-oil countries, the OECD countries, and the non-oil
developing countries. The only exception is a high correlation between the 60's and 70's in the small
sample of OECD countries, but this reverts to zero between the 70's and 80's.
Figure 2 shows that persistence stays low at various period lengths in the postwar data. This
is confirmed by partial data on long-run growth rates for 30 year periods over 1870-1988'. We have
a total of 54 observations for 23 OECD and Latin American countries. Figure 3 shows growthplotted
against lagged growth for these 30 year periods. Portugal is illustrative: decent growth in 1870-99,
negative growth in 1900-29, average growth in 1930-59. and one of the highest growth rates in 1960-
'We have calculaced the Iesat..quaii growth rum of per capim incoren dam borrowed from EesrrIy ted RebelO (1993). who use muurJy
Maddison (1959). it need baldly be mid this tha dam u even more subjec* is error than the recent dam. untiuding error! asaoduced by
esreapolenon over long persodu.5
88.The correlationof 30-year per capita growthwith per capita growth in the previous 30 year
period inthisdatais only .l2.
One possible explanation for low persistencein the recent data is instability in agriculture due
to price and weather shocks. Figure4showspersistence coefficientsforgrowth ofvalue added per
worker in agriculture, industry, and services. The rankpersistenceof agriculture is zero between the
70s and80sand is low betweenthe60s and70s. However,industry andservicesalso have low
persistence.
Table 2 shows the low contemporaneous correlations of growth rates across sectors (with the
exceptionof services in the 70s,whenit had about a one-half correlation with bothindustryand
agriculture). The low correlations could meanthatshocks to individual sectors,suchas relative price
movements that pull factors like capitaland skilled entrepreneursout of one sector andintoothers,
aremoreimportantthan shocksaffectingallsectors, suchas increases in economy-widehuman
capital.6 However,another explanation for low cross-sector correlationscouldbe that even
economy-wide shocks cause sectoral shiftsbecause ofchanging comparative advantage.
Measurement error in the level of GDP could create artificially low persistence in growth
rates, by leading to anunderestimateof growthinone periodand an overestimatein thenext,or vice
versa. However, we do not believe thatmeasurement errorexplains low persistence. First, growth
ratesare probably not constructed by estimating GDP in subsequentperiods - morelikely, growth
estimates are prepared first, and GDP in the second period is estimated from these growth estimates.
Second, we calculated persistence between periodsthat did notcontain a common endpoint but instead
'Thio conoIoon u from thepooled regremon of thevecmr 101960-aS 01930-59GI9)-291onthe vector(01930-59G19-29
01870-991whoreeach Oox-yy baa 23 elementsrepresenong growthfrom xx toyy for each coustoy in the simple of 23 cOufloles.Because
the penasleisee coefficient is neosidvetoouthers in snsiulsamples,thismsmberjumps aroundfrom em setofperiodsoralone setof
countries to another.Foreumple. forthe 16 industhalcounesesin Maddison (1989).the correlanons ictors hisa4jacrnt penodi 870-
1913. 1913-50. 1950-73. and 1973-81 ate .38. -.35. anti .46.
Oarozercixe is related so the analysisof Stocbsian (1988)this examinessector-specific oral counny-opecific ihocks at business-cycle
frequeociei.6
were separated bya gap ofoneor several years. Thisleft persistence unchanged or loweredit.rather
thanraisingitas wouldoccurif measurement error were important. Third. as Figures 2 and 3 show.
persistenceremainstowevenover tongperiods. Finally,while iid measurement error in levels would
tower persistence, other types of measurement error —such ascountry-specifictendenciesto
overreport growth rates—would raise persistence.
1'.Are Country Characteristics Persistent?
The most straightforward explanation of the low persistence of growth rates wouldbethat the
country characteristics usually thought to determine growth are themselves not persistent. This section
shows this explanation to be untenable: country characteristics are persistent. Figure 5 shows
persistence of country characteristics between the 60's and 70's, and between the 70's and 80's for a
sample of 45 countries for which data is available for all variables and time periods. The variables
chosen are those that appear in the classic growth regression of liarro (1991), as well as several
others common in the literature. All of the country characteristics display far higher persistence than
growth rates. Many other country characteristics, like culture and geography, must be even more
persistent.
However, some aggregate index of policy variables could still have low persistence.7 To
construct such an index, we use the variables shown in Figure 5 with a pooled time-series cross-
section regression on 10 year averages. Table 3 shows regressions using the Barro (1991) variables
with the exception of his PPI6ODEV (deviation of the relative price of investment from the sample
mean), which is not available in individual decades for a sufficient sample. (Our government
consumption variable does not exclude spending on defense and education as Barros did, due to lack
of decade data on the latter.) We allow the intercepts to vary across decades. We also perform a
'Sincethepersisiefice of a lines, cornbrnanonofvanables dependa on the positive or neiweve covananee among them. it is possiblefor
anaggiqawuidcs of counoypoliciesto show lower persisicnee than anyofin componensi.7
second regression with a broader set of country characteristics. The fittedvalues fromthis regression
(denoted Barro Index andAugmentedBarroIndex,respectively) are also farmorepersistent than
growth rates,as shownin Figure 5.
Ratesof factor accumulation aremuchmore persistent than growth razes. To compute an
index of factor accumulation, we regressed aggregate growth (not per capita) on investment and labor
force growth, using a sample of 115 countries which have data for all three decades. Figure 6 shows
that investment, labor force growth, and the fitted value of growth predicted by the two are much
more persistent than growth. The residuals from this regression can be interpreted, under certain
assumptions, as the deviations of total factor productivity growth for each country from the global
mean.C As shown in the graph, TFP growth rates are even less persistent than growth rates.
II) Shocks and Policies
This section argues that shocks, especially shocks to the terms of trade, are an important
determinant of variations in growth razes over ten year periods, and that they can help account for
low persistence.
Below we test how much of the variation in growth rates between countries can be statistically
explained in terms of differences in policies, and how much is due to differences in shock variables,
such as the terms of trade, external transfers, the change in the number of war related casualties per
capita on national territory, and the presence of a debt crisis. We show that much of the variance in
growth rates, even over periods as long as a decade, can be directly explained by shocks,° Moreover,
Thccoefficiena of thc regrninion were as follows (1-nanioci in pienuthelen): connano term -.004 (-.8 I). on Invenmient share .07
(4.1), on labor force growth .65 (4.92), on a dwnzny for die 60's .030(9.0). on a dwnmy for the lOs .019 (4.99). R-sqssared was .23and
there wise 345 obnervaaona (decade averigen for 60n. lOs. and SOs for 115 cconiws). As is well known. the rogreinion can be innapreted
as a cross-counay esamate of a producOon funcoa under die rether heroic asnsnspøona of connani capitel-osispue redos across counmes.
ocOgenosss capital and labor growth. end connani pssenaiers across Consoles of the (Cobb-Douglai) production fusscnon. The coelfictent
on labor growth is the esturrase of the labor shase, which isa reasonable .65. However, the isriplind enonsate of the capital-output tine ((I-
65)/.073 —4.87) seems aso high.
'The finding diii shocks play an important role in growth at long hofleona is reminiscent of the onporsanee anerbutad so technology
shocki an the real business cycle liternn.rre (e.g. Long and Plosser (1983)).8
shocks indirectly influence growth by changing policy variables.Thusthe low persistenceofshocks.
particularly external shocks,helps explain the low persistence ofgrowthrates.
Table 4 shows the simple correlations of three shock variables with growth rates.'° The
variables are (1) the growth in dollar export prices times the initial share of exports in GDPminusthe
growth in import prices times the initial share of imports in GDP(termsof trade change); (2) the
change in war casualties per capita on national temtosy; and (3) a dummy measuring countries likely
tohavea debt crisis in the 1980$." Growthisstrongly correlated with terms of trade improvements
and high external debt in the 80's, and with war in the 70's (and weakly with war in the 80's).
Whenshock variables are added to a regression with a small set of significant country
characteristics from section I, they have substantial explanatory power compared to policy variables
(Table 5). We add the three variables from the previous paragraph and, for completeness, the per
annum increase in official transfers. The partial R2 of the policy variables (enrollments, black market
premium, M2/GDP) in the 1970s was .26 and of the shocks .14, while in the 1980$ the partial R2 of
the policy variables was .10 versus .15 for shock variables.'2
The terms of trade effect is large and strongly significant in both periods. In the 1980$ a
favorable terms of trade shock of I percentage point of GDP per annum raises the growth rate by .85
percentage point per annum. Recall that GDP is measured in constant prices, so there is no direct
effect of a terms of trade shock on growth. This increase in growth is far larger than would be
created simply through the effect of the increased income on savings. Even if all the shock passed
'OurthinkAng about proper definidorn of shock ennoble, beswflnnd from the rotated work of McCasthy aM Dhazasbwsr (1991)
This isaduniosyvaflable meaasnng whether the debt inGDPrun was above50 peereasas 1990 Ia low aM middle-income counmes.
Wedo nothave compasible sasUsdos for rich cawisnea. but in a' case no rich couney expenenemi an caramel debt crisza. Date on terms
of aide, exporas. imposm, caramel debt, iM GOP are from the World Bank's lnrannil datebese: date on war cumsldes ate from Sivasd
(1991).
The pardui 5' of a tory er pardoulng out a is the 5' of the regression of the coniponene of y aM x orthogonal asa. This is riot
the rncvornensal it' aM the coniponeno do riot nun intheroast it'. Both petal 5¼ carbide the bUrial level of GOP.9
intosaving, and the rate of return Co capital were (optimistically) 20 percent, growth would only
increase by .2 percentage points.
Factor movements are one potential explanation of large growth effects from terms of trade
shocks.3Forexample,labor orcapita] might flow within the country to the sector receiving a
favorable shock,capitalmight flow in from abroad to the export sector, or domestic savings might
respond to improved export opportunities. In order to generate large growth effects throughfactor
movements, however, factors and export demand must be elastic, and terms of trade shocks must be
at least somewhat persistent.
External shock variables other than the terms of trade have smaller effects on growth, partly
reflecting substantial multicollinearity among the shocks and between shock and policy variables. The
variable for the increase in war casualties is marginally significant in the 70's but not in the 80's: we
fail to detect significant separate effects of transfers and debt crises. The magnitude of the coefficient
on the war casualty variable implies relatively modest effects of wars in most cases. Violence in
Chile associated with the overthrow of Allende and its aftermath are estimated to have cost .3
percentage points of growth per annum in the 70's. Israel's wars during the 70's are estimated to
have lowered growth during the decade by .2 percentage points per annum. Highest casualties per
capita in the sample were from the civil war in Uganda, which was estimated to have reduced growth
in the 70's by 3 percentage points per annum. Given the distribution of various shock variables (with
a few large values for casualties, transfers, and terms of trade movements) the results for individual
variables are sensitive to choice of sample.
'Another way to explain a large growth response to memo of trade nsovetssenm would be through two-gap models of the type popular in
the 1960's,in whichforeign exchange xx a separate biodmg canonist on the roonensy. A moremodem explanation might be that the social
value of foreign exchange tohigherthan the private value,perhapsbecause it is used to import macharms that carry rxtarrt,alines, as in De
Long xrtd Surnmer (1991. 1992. 1993). Finally, the high coefficient could reflect a Keynesian aggregate demaed effect, which would be
surpnsing at such a long period length.10
The shocks help explain the low persistence of the observed growth rates. The correlation of
the growth rates between the 1970s and 1980s is -.05 in this sample of countries, while the
persistence of the component of predicted growth dependent on the non-shock variables was .63. The
correlation between decades of the fined growth component due to shocks was -.08 and the
persistence of the fined growth rates including all variables was •37l4
The shock variables influenced growth not only directly, but also indirectly, through policy
variables. Table 6 reports regression of the black market premium on shock variables. War is
associated with a high black market premium and favorable terms of trade changes with a lower
premium.
This casts doubt on the widespread interpretation of the black market premium as an indicator
of bad policies. If shock variables are omitted, estimates of the effect of the black market premium
on growth will falsely attribute externally-induced adversity to policy. Table 5 demonstrates that the
inclusion of shock variables in the regression reduces the coefficient and significance levels on the
black market premium, especially in the 1980's, when it cuts the coefficient in half.
To summarize, shocks are important over decade-long periods, they help explain the
difference between the persistence of actual and predicted growth, and they influence 'policy'
variables, and thus estimates of the impact of policies.
III) Pers1st and Growth Theory
This section examines the interpretation of low persistence under two types of growth models.
In the first type of model, long-run growth depends on country characteristics. For example, in the
AK model of Rebelo (1991), growth depends on tax rates. In closed economy versions of Romer
(1990) or Aghion and Howict (1992), technological change, and therefore economic growth, depend
The esarnered parunwiors of thu 1970, were used re colculute the ptodscsed growth componemm for the 9805. Using the slope
coficaenn from a pooled regression the decade canelaóons follow roughly the sante pauern growth -.05. policy .736. shocks -.426. toed
v,jue .243.11
on a countrys patent system and market size. In simple versions of these models, low persistence of
growth rates implies that random shocks are important in determining the long-run path of output. In
(he second type of model, which includes both the neoclassical model with exogenous technological
change and some models of technological diffusion, growth is a world-wide process, and country
characteristics determine the relative level of income. In these models, low persistence is consistent
with shocks of any size, and shocks may play only a minor role in determining the long-run path of
output,despitebeing an important determinant of variance in decade-long growth rates.
a. Modefr in Which Cowuvy Characteristics Determine Long-Run Growth
In a simple model in which country characteristics determine growth, the persistence
coefficient can be interpreted as reflecting the magnitude of variance in underlying growth rates
across countries relative to the variance of random shocks. To see this, denote the long-run growth
rate associated with the policies of country i as g1. This can be represented as the world average
growth rate, g, plus a country specific component e,, determined by country characteristics. Growth
for country i in period tequalsits underlying growth rate, plus a country-specific, period-specific
shock. (A period specific aggregate shock could also be added, but would not affect the results.)
Thus.
=g+e1÷evar(c,) =avar(e) = (1)
The simplest assumption one can make is that ,ande are independent normal variables, andis
serially uncorrelated. Under this assumption, the persistence coefficient, denoted p,is12
E(g,-g)(g, _____ p 22 (2)
IE(g,,_g)2 JE(g,1 _)2 0 +
Thissimplemodel of countryfixed effects does not allow for changes in policy over time. However,
since policies change only slowly, it may be a reasonable approximation over periods that are not too
long. Under this model, the best forecast of a country's growth rate will be a weighted combination
of its own past growth rate and the average growth rate of all other countries.0
Underthis model of fixed country effects, low persistence bounds the potential R2 that can be
achieved itt growth regressions. Even if policies were perfectly measured, and all policies and other
factors affecting growth were taken into account, the expected R2 in a thirty-year growth regression
would be only about 0.6. To see this, note that the expected R2 from regressing growth over n
periods on a perfect measure of policies that determine the country's long-nm growth rate will be
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E[R2(n)] =_____
Fromthe definition of the persistence coefficient, o =(l-p)o12/p. Hencethe expected R2 from
regressing growth over n periods on a perfect measure of the policies that determine the country-
specific underlying growth rate, €,willbe
R2(n)} =_____ = (
Ifone defines a period as ten years, then p is approximately 1/3, so the expected R2 over a thirty-year
period, given a perfect measure of policies is only 0.6. Thus if this model of fixed country effects
describes the data, it is unlikely that we will see much increase over the current R5 Sinthe literature.
which are already in this range. For example. Levine and Renelt (1992. p. 947) report R2s from .46
to .62 in their basic regressions for growth over 1960-89. Of course R2 is a random variable, so in
the process of many authors running regressions, it would not be surprising if some obtained higher
R2s. On the other hand, the expected R2 given existing imperfect measures of policy would be less
than 0.6.
The Imding that in this model even a perfect measure of policies would explain only 60% of
variance in growth rates over a thirty-year period has economic as well as econometric implications.
In this simple model, low persistence implies that luck is important relative to policies in deterrnming
the long-run path of output. This model in which country characteristics determine long-run growth
thus leaves much of growth unexplained.
This simple model assumes shocks are serially uncorrelated. If there were negative senal
correlation in the shocks, or if growth caine in spurts for deterministic reasons, persistence would be14
lower for given variance in underlying growth rates across countries. Thus, policies would play a
more important role in determining the long-run path of output.It is not clear why one should
expect substantial negative serial correlation over successive ten-year periods. For the spurts
hypothesis, it is interesting to note that for the countries that have four decades of data in the
Summers and Heston (1991) sample, on average around 60% of their growth from 1950 to 1988 is
achieved in the fastest-growing decade within that period. However, it is not clear whether this is
due to deterministic spurts of growth or to high random variation.
b. Modelsin which WorldwideTechnological Progress Determines Lông-Run Growth
Under a different type of model, worldwide technological progress determines long-run
growth and country characteristics determine steady state relative levels of income. This category
includes not only the neoclassical model (Solow (1956)), but also some models of technological
diffusion. Suppose, for example, that technological progress at some rate g is generated in a few
advanced countries by a process of the type described by Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and then diffuses to other countries with lags of various lengths. Let diffusion follow the process
B X(p)(A -B)
where B is the level of technology in a backward country, p is the set of policies in that country, and
A is the level of technology in the advanced countries. Thus counthes that are further behind have
more learning potential, and countries with better policies learn faster. Setting BIB =A/A=g
implies the steady state value of B/A will be X(p)/(g+X(p))." in this model, the relative steady state
level of income is determined by policy, but except for those countries large and advanced enough to
generate a significant share of world technology, long-run growth is exogenously determined. Under
either a neoclassical model of capital accumulation or models of technological diffusion which
'Fora sunlit,approach.sotNelsonandPhelps (1966). Joo,vKaurdt,ach (1991), or enhzbib and RusOchini (1993).15
Incorporate advantagesofbackwardness,persistencedepends on the distribution of countnes' incomes
relative to their steadystateincome.
Addinganindependent normal error term to a linearized version of these models allows
persistence to be characterized.Ifthere is a wide dispersion of distances between countries initial
incomes and their steady states, then transitional dynamics wIll dominate the effect of the random
error term. The countries furthest below their steady state will grow the fastest. Relative growth
rates will initially be highly persistent. However, as all countries approach their steady state levels of
income, persistence will fall because transitional dynamics will become less important relative to the
random error term. Asymptotically countries will converge to an ergodic distribution around the
steady state, in which persistence will be negative since countries which receive a positive random
shock one period will tend to fall back towards the steady state the next period.'7
This can be easily seen in Barro and Sala-i-Martin's linearized version of the neoclassical
model with an added random shock, but similar results hold in the diffusion model. In the
neoclassical model, Y1,.1 =
—y1) where YLs denotes log income of country i at time t.
ydenotes steady state income,is a random shock, and v E (0,1) measures the speed of
adjustment to the steady state, which depends on a host of parameters, including the capital share.
Thus growth between and t+l, denoted g,, equals v(,y—y.)+s1. Iterating,
=v(y'—(y.+v(y '—y1) + + Given this, it is straightforward to write persistence as
'We consider theimpactofshocks toincome, but shocks to policy would have similar consequences.since these alterthestonily state
level of income end 5anscaonaJ dyiwnics me dcscrnuoad by the difference between nitisl end the steady state level of income.
See Bane mel 5a1o-i-Mnztm (1992). n corresponds to l-c°intheir riounon. This osasisple etsumea that all counirses have the some
-
stonily state sod iltat there is no exogenoustecMologtcalpmgtess. bus it would be sititgborwsrd 50 genernlaze site nodel.16
function of the cross-section variance of income. Since g.—j = v(3—v.)+and ciI I
g.1 = v[(,—y)—v—y)—sfJ]÷p1/1 the covariance of g, and g,+1 is
=
(v2_v3)a,2_vo (7)
wheredenotes the cross-sectional variance of log income at tune t, and a, denotes the variance of
the shock. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin show,
=(1_v)2c +g (8)




Since the numerator increases more than proportionally in o2 and the denominator increases less than
proportionally in 2, persistence increases with the cross-section variance of income. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin show that as t goes to infinity, the cross-section variance monotonicaIly9 approaches the
steady state value, o =a/ (2v—v2). Thus if the initial cross-section vath.nce is greater than its
steady state value, persistence will decline over time. Persistence is asymptotically negative, since the
limit of the covariance between a countty's growth at t and at t+ I is
'Thisajunus an infinbe number of counthe3. Withs finite number of counmu petisianue wowd be a rsaiomsortable.17
(v2_v3)a2 2 urn cov(g,,g,1) =_______ = (10)
2v—v2 2-v
which must be negative.
Note thatevenif the random shocks are arbitrarily small, these models predict that persistence
will asymptotically become negative. Under this model, a country's time path of income could be
determined almost completely by worldwide technological change and its policies, but if it were close
to its steady state income a large percentage of the time series variance in its growth rate would be
explained by random shocks. In this case the growth rate would just represent fluctuations around a
steady state income.
This model could be generalized by allowing each country to have its own steady state level
of income depending on policies, and by allowing for exogenous technological change. In this case,
persistence depends not on variance of income, but on variance in the gap between actual income and
steady state income relative to the level of technology. If countries vary greatly in their distance from
their relative steady states, persistence will be high. The countries far below their relative steady
state income will initially have persistently high growth rates. As they approach the steady state.
their growth rate will fall.
Asymptotically, there is a sharp distinction between models in which country characteristics
determine long-run growth and models in which country characteristics determine relative steady state
income. However, if countries are far from their steady states, models in which country
characteristics determine income look similar to those in which country characteristics determine
growth rates.
One difficulty with this type of model is that it does not explain why we observe countries
outside the ergodic distribution around the steady state. Barro and Sala-i-Martin have suggested18
countnesmaybeoutside this distribution due to large, infrequent shocks, such as wars, depressions,
orindustrialrevolutions. Such shocks couldplausibly affect only a subset of counthes, thus creating a
wide distributionof ratios ofactualto steady state relative income.
This modelhasseveraltestable implications for persistence. It predicts high and declining
persistence following a large shock that displaces countries or regions differing distances from their
steady states. It predicts low persistence in regions which are similar distances away from their
steady states, which might plausibly be regions of a country. Finally, it predicts that controlling for
initial income should generate very low persistence in samplesofregions with similar steady states,
since in these models persistence is due to transition dynamics.
Results from U.S. states and European provinces seem consistent with the predictions of the
model, although the evidence is far from decisive. Negative persistence is much more common
among states than among countries, as would be expected if states are more likely than countries to be
similar distances away from their steady states, Growth rates of personal per capita income in the
U.S. states, shown in Table 7, have negative persistence from the 20's to the 30's. probably reflecting
the large shocks of the collapse of agricultural prices in the 20's and the Great Depression of the
3D's, which adversely affected the poorest states which had been growing most quickly. In the next 3
decades, persistence was positive (although weaker between the 40's and 50's). Persistence then is
zero between the 60's and 70's, and negative between the 70's and 80's, as would make sense if U.S.
states were close to their steady states by then. Controlling for initial income makes persistence
consistently low or negative, as predicted by the neoclassical models.
Data from 73 European provinces (covering Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) provides further support for the model. Persistence across
e8a,Toand Saia+Manm (1991) fInd it to be important to conuol (or od shocks in their study of conver5eoce antong the U.S.stutos.
Weiregratcitsi to Robert Bamo (or kindiy sharing the datu set on U.S.stunuand Eiuopeinprootncu.19
subsequent decades from the 50's to the 80's is low, with negativepersistenceagainobservedforthe
80's. Controlling for initial income makes persistence even lower. However, it is difficult to
explain why persistence was low from the 1950's to 1960's, since different European countries were
probablydifferent distances away from their steady state then.
We also have a small amount of regional data from developing countries. The data is on gross
rather than per capita product for provinces in China, India, and Indonesia, and on per capita product
for provinces in Colombia.n We found negative persistence for 25 Chinese provinces across
subsequent periods of 1952-63, 1963-74, and 1974-85, negative persistence for 24 Colombian
provinces for periods of 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-80, and 1980-90, and essentially zero persistence for
20 Indian provinces between 1970-77 and 1978-83. These results seem consistent with the
neoclassical model. Indonesia, on the other hand, had strongly positive persistence for 26 provinces
between 1975-79 and 1979-84, but the time period was short, and oil-producing Indonesia had just
received a strong shock with differential effects across provinces: the oil price increase of 1973-74.
Just as these models predict high persistence following a large shock to the income of a group
of countries, such as a war, they predict high persistence following a large shock to the policies of a
country, such as a major policy reform. As mentioned earlier, a group of East Asian countries and
Botswana had consistently high growth. It seems plausible that many of them adopted policies at the
beginning of the period that led to steady state levels of income far above their initial income levels.
On the other hand, few countries were consistent bad performers. This may indicate that countries
with high levels of income do not often change to policies that give them a low level of steady state
income.
The80s hcr ,s just 1980-55.
The da souitcs u Gocrnmem of India (1984). Ceiin.i Burtau of sstnsocs of 1ndoias,a (various yevs), Stab Siaasncal Burouu of
China (1987).andCardersas es al. (1992) for Colombia.20
In sum, under the simplest model in which country characteristics determine long run growth
rates, low persistence implies that there are largerandomshocks. This, in turn, implies that such
theories, if correct, leave much of growth unexplained, and that a country's income level will be
determined in large part by its luck in the past. These models could be reconciled with a dominant
role for policy in determining the long-run path of income if there were large negative serial
correlation in shocks, if growth caine in spurts, or if policies changed rapidly. On the other hand.
under models in which growth is determined by a worldwide process of technological change and by
transitional dynamics, luck may determine only fluctuations in income around a long run trend.
Under these models, low persistence implies that countries must be at similar enough distances from
their steady states that shocks are important relative to transitional dynamics. Non-negative
persistence implies that countries must not yet be in an ergodic distribution around their steady states.
Conclusion
Relative growth rates of output per worker across countries are not very persistent. This low
persistence is robust to choice of sample, is not an artefact of changes in oil prices or of agricultural
disturbances, and it extends over long periods. In contrast to growth rates themselves, the country
characteristics which are often thought of as determinants of growth are highly persistent. Shocks,
especially terms of trade shocks, statistically explain as much of the variance in growth rates over 10
year periods as do country policies.
Models in which country characteristics determine long-run growth can be reconciled to these
facts only if they generate spurts in growth or if there are large random shocks. In contrast, models in
which worldwide technological change determines long-run growth predict low persistence if countries
are near the steady state relative income levels determined by their policies.21
The findingthatmuch variation in growth rates is due to random shocks should induce
caution in attributing high growth rates to good policy (or to a good 'work ethic'). Just as a baseball
star is dubbeda clutchhitter after a lucky hit, some so-called economic miracles are likely due to
random variation.22
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Table 1: Simple and ranic
correlations of growth rate
across periods
60's with 70's correlation
coefficient:
70's with 80's correlation
coefficient:
Sample: Sample Size:Simple Rank Simple Rank
All Countries 100 .212 .233 .313 .157
All non-oil 89 .153 .227 .301 .187
OECD 22 .729 .701 .069 .086
Developing
countries, non-oil
67 .099 .150 .332 .25127




Agriculture, Industry .09 .29 14
Agriculture, Services .10 .45 31
Industry, Services .20 .57 .27
Sample Size 67 67 3928
Table 3: Pooled Cross-section Time Series Regressions of Long-Term Growth
on Policy Variables with Decade Averages


































Share of trade in GDP (Initial) -.0059
(1.18)






1Absolutevalues of t-stazistjcs calculated with MacKinnon-Whjte (1985)
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is
the least-squares growth rate of Summers-Heston (1991) output per worker.
2/Pooledregression has separate decade constant terms, nor reported.29













rsigmncant at 10% level
sigrnficant at 5% level
significant at 1% level30
Table 5: Growth regrassiOns with shock variablea
Dependent variable: Per annum growth rate of GDP per worker
Independent variables: 1970's 1980's

















































Per annum terms of trade gain

















Heavily indebted (initial) -.007
(0.82)
Summary statistics
Number observations 80 80 80 80
.265 .371
oLe: i-statistics, in parentheses, are computed using macrunnon-w ute (19) fleterosKeast1city-
consistent standard errors.31
Table6: Shocks andtheblack market prnium
Dependentvariable: Black market premium(logaverage)
Variables: 1970s 1980s

















[ole: T-staflstlcs COTTIPUICO using M3C1flDOfl-Wh1t ( 985) he osdacity-COnsiStent standard
errors.32
Table 7: Persistence Among U.S. States and European Provinces
48 U.S. Stcies Raw Data Controlling for
Initial Income
1920's with 30's -.47 -.13
1930's with 40's .41 13
1940's with 50's .17 -.40
1950's with 60's .49 .27
1960's with 70's .02 -.26
1970's with 80's -.68 -.62
73 European Provinces
1950's with 60's .10 -.13
1960's with 70's .29 .20
1970's with 80's -.33 -.19
Note: In the regression of growth rates on initial income for the European provinces, we allow a
different intercept for each country.Figure 1: Per Worker Growth Ratea Per Year, 1960-73
and 1974-88
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 Figure 3: Persistence of per capita growth rates across
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